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Organizational renewal requires that a firm's top managers make timely adjustments in their
mental models following significant changes in the environment. Our initial propositions
about the difference between renewal and decline focused on whether similar organizations
in similar contexts differ in their ability to recognize significant changes in their environments.
Analysis of longitudinal data from a matched pair of U.S. railroads suggested, however,
that renewal hinges not so much on noticing new conditions, but on being able to link
environmental change to corporate strategy and to modify that linkage over time. In the
successful company we studied organizational renewal is a continuous process of first and
second order changes in cognitive maps.
Why are some firms able to adjust to changing
circumstances while others fail to respond to
environmental changes that threaten their long-
run viability? Most corporations are governed
by experienced directors, pay high salaries to
talented managers, have access to consultants,
and receive hourly information on how the
market assesses their prospects. Yet with all of
these advantages, many firms enter periods of
declining performance. Some of these firms are
able to renew themselves, others never recover.
Decline is even more vexing because firms
frequently alter strategies and structures in
response to environmental changes (Chandler.
1962). Nor is adaptation limited to successful
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firms. Bowman (1982), for example, notes that
the managers of firms with poor performance
are active risk takers. With this evidence of
responsiveness to changes in the environment,
the question of why some firms are able to renew
themselves while others are not takes on added
importance and interest.
Kiesler and Sproull (1982: 548) suggest that
'[a] crucial component of managerial behavior in
rapidly changing environments is problem sens-
ing, the cognitive processes of noticing and
constructing meaning about environmental
change so that organizations can take action.'
Lenz (1981), Bartunek (1984). and Huff and
Schwenk (1990) describe how environmental
changes can prompt changes in 'interpretive
schemes' or cognitive models of the world that
may lead to organizational restructuring. We
propose that the cognitive processes of 'noticing
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and constructing meaning' offer important insights
into the phenomenon of organizational renewal.
More specifically, managers" mental models
both facilitate and limit attention to and encoding
of salient information about changes in organi-
zational environments. Mental models help indi-
viduals cope with an overabundance of available
stimuli (Kiesler and Sproull. 1982), but strongly
held mental models may lead managers to over
look important environmental changes so that
appropriate action at the organizational level is
not taken (Hall, 1976, 1984). The persistence of
mental models that are no longer appropriate
would explain why organizational decline is often
'a protracted process' or 'a downward spiral'
(Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1988), despite an
abundance of managerial talent and cues of
trouble. We propose that organizational renewal
requires managers to change their mental models
in response to environmental changes and that
delays in this process will be associated with
decline. We also propose a number of expla-
nations for delays in the adjustment process and
examine several distinctions between the mental
models associated with renewal and those associ-
ated with decline.
The study investigates the link between changes
in mental models and changes in organizational
action by analyzing the causal assertions made
by leaders of two initially similar U.S. railroads
over a 25-year period. One firm, the Chicago
and North Western (C»&NW). engaged in radical
restructing during a period of radical environmen-
tal change and continues to be a viable company
today. The Chicago. Rock Island and Pacific
(Rock Island), on the other hand, showed steady
dechne until it went bankrupt in the mid-1970s.
Analysis of causal maps from these two
companies shows significant differences in the
timing of their responses to industry decline, but
as we analyzed data from these two companies.
we broadened the focus of our theoretical
explanation from the importance of recognizing
key environmental changes. Causal maps from
the study underscore the critical link between
managers' understandings of environmental con-
ditions and firm strategy. One important way
strategic renewal occurs for the C&NW is through
incremental reassessments that ultimately lead to
major changes in operating procedures. In fact,
evidence for this company provides detailed
support at the cognitive level for descriptions of
strategic change available for some time in the
strategy literature from Mintzberg (1978). Ouinn
(1980). Pettigrew (1985), and others.
TOWARD A COGNITIVE
EXPLANATION OE ORGANIZATIONAL
RENEWAL
Simon (1955) notes that individuals have limited
data processing capabilities, yet these limited
capabilities must be used to process vast amounts
of ambiguous data (March and Simon. 1958). To
make sense of the world, managers rely on
simplified representations or mental models
(Kiesler and Sproull, 1982). Defined by O'Keefe
and Nadel (1978) as 'an aggregate of interrelated
information,' mental models consist of concepts
and relationships an individual uses to understand
various situations or environments (Weick and
Bougon. 1986). They serve as 'maps' allowing
individuals to perceive environments on a larger
scale, beyond the range of immediate perception
(Weick and Bougon, 1986; Huff, 1990). A
feature of mental models of particular interest to
management researchers involves cause-effect
understandings about the environment
(Bougon. Weick. and Binkhorst. 1977; Eden,
Jones, and Sims; 1979; Narayanan and Fahey,
1990). Narayanan and Fahey. who focus
especially on the problems of organization
decline, argue that • • J*:
[clause maps provide a convenient shorthand to
describe the lenses which filter data and a means
by which data are interpreted. In this view,
decision makers |can be] viewed as active
selectors and interpreters of data (1990: UO).
Roles played by mental models
Given human frailties as information processors,
mental models allow individuals and organizations
to make sense of their environment and act
within it. The problem, of course, is that mental
models may be, or become, inaccurate. Given
cognitive limitations, mental maps will always be
incomplete; inaccuracy may increase, however,
as environments change.
Mental models can exacerbate a mismatch
between data availability and information pro-
cessing in three important ways. First, mental
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models determine what information will receive
attention. Nisbett and Ross (1980), show that
individuals recall the elements or features of a
stimulus situation that are most prominent in
their mental models. Managers thus can be
expected to focus their attention on environmen-
tal changes that are most salient to, or offer
support for. their current mental models, while
other potentially important changes in the
environment may not be recognized (Kiesler and
Sproull. 1982).
This problem is compounded because the
stimuli gaining attention tend to be interpreted
in relation to the individual's current mental
model (Galambos and Rips. 1982) rather than
seen as a signal of needed change. Even if events
growing out of a changing environment are
noticed, then, managers may not perceive a need
for strategic renewal (Dutton and Jackson, 1987;
Sapienza, 1987).
A third key finding from cognitive research is
that mental maps direct action (Nisbett and Ross,
1980). Just as mental maps selectively limit
information attended to and similarly slant how
this information is interpreted, existing mental
maps will also limit the range of alternative
solutions to the issues that have been identified
(Bateman and Zeithamel. 1989; Cyert and March.
1963; Duhaime and Schwenk. 1985; Dutton.
Fahey, and Narayanan. 1983; Mintzberg, Rais-
inghani, and Theoret. 1976). Renewal efforts
may be further hampered because actions that
are consistent with existing models are likely to
generate data that can once again be interpreted
in light of existing mental models.
The accuracy of the mental model may improve
as subsequent events provide information to
modify erroneous understandings. As Weick
(1983, 1987, 1990) suggests, 'incorrect" models
can also lead to 'correct' action. Many researchers
argue, however, that mental models often fail to
change in a timely manner in response to
a changing environment and that inaccurate
models are associated with deteriorating per-
formance (Hedberg and Jonsson. 1977; Hed-
berg. Nystrom, and Starbuck. 1976). Whetten's
(1988) research shows, for example, that organ-
izational decline is the result of significant
changes in the environment that either go
unnoticed, are improperly interpreted, or are
addressed through inappropriate actions by top
managers.
Learning and change in mental models
Many researchers propose that organizational
renewal hinges on learning—a process that
necessarily requires additions to or changes in
mental models (Huber. 1991; Fiol and Lyies,
19K5). Mental models that can no longer accom-
modate or explain occurrences in the environment
must be altered and new understandings of the
environment must be developed.
One influential way of characterizing this
process focuses on unfreezing, change, and
refreezing (Lewin, 1947), three phases that have
been applied to both individual and organizational
learning. During the unfreezing stage, old beliefs
are discarded in order to make way for new
understandings. This process has also been
referred to as unlearning and is considered a
key preliminary stage in the learning process
(Hedberg. 1981; Nystrom and Starbuck. 1984).
Once old beliefs are unlearned, new understand-
ings about the environment can be achieved, often
via experimentation (Hedberg. 1981; Starbuck,
Greve. and Hedberg. 1978). In the final phase,
changes in mental models are solidified. New
belief structures ultimately become 'frozen' as
they are supported by the occurrence of antici-
pated events (Argyris. 1976; Hedberg and Jons-
son, 1977; Nystrom and Starbuck. 1984).
The literature also points to a two-tiered
conceptualization of individual and organizational
learning (Argyris, 1976; Fiol and LyIes, 1985).
Low level or single loop learning is reflected in
changes in behavior rather than changes in
understanding. This kind of learning results in
incremental modifications or minor adjustments
to existing interpretations (Watzlawick. Weak-
land, and Fisch, 1974). Higher level or double
loop learning, on the other hand, involves a
restructuring of the individual's mental models
and results in significant changes in understand-
ing. This higher level learning involves unlearn-
ing, the deletion of concepts or assumed
associations between concepts in the environ-
ment, and the addition of new concepts and
associations.
Four hypotheses about organizational renewal
Because of the way they direct attention and
guide the encoding of information, the mental
models of firm leaders offer an explanation for
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Figure 1. A cognitive model of organizational renewal
how organizations deal effectively with a changing
environment, how they identify appropriate
responses, and thus renew themselves. Our
framework of the mental processes that contribute
to this kind of updating is illustrated in Figure
1. The framework suggests that top managers'
mental models must keep pace with changes in
their environments, so that they have updated
understandings of the settings in which their firms
operate.
The initial hypotheses of this study address
four issues related to this figure.
Renewal requires a change in mental models
The central hypothesis of the study suggests that
organizational decline may result if managers fail
to make significant changes in their mental
models given a substantial change in the environ-
ment (Hall. 1976, 1984, Hedberg and Jonsson,
1977). No longer appropriate mental models may
prevent managers from sensing problems, delay
changes in strategy, and lead to action that is
ineffective in a new environment.
The consequences of action also feed into the
likelihood of changing strategy. Action expresses
cause-effect beliefs, subsequent events either
confirm {expected outcomes) or contradict
(unexpected outcomes) those beliefs. Confir-
mation strengthens current mental models and
thus future actions are expected to be based on
currently held beliefs. Contradiction, on the other
hand, requires reevaluation of current menta!
models. If the current set of beliefs is unable to
explain the outcome, an adjustment or change
in mental model is required. This line of
reasoning, added to our observations about
managerial attention, suggests the first hypoth-
esis:
HI: Given a substantial change in the environ-
ment, firms that successfully renew their strat-
egies will show more rapid succession or change
in mental models than firms that experience
organizational decline.
What factors cause or contribute to a delay in
the succession of managers' mental models?
Three possibilities seem especially plausible:
A munificent environment may confirm outdated
mental models. Delay in the succession of mental
models may be the result of a munificent
environment. One of Hambrick and D'Aveni's
(1988) key findings is that significant weaknesses
appear in failing firms as early as 10 years before
bankruptcy, but go unaddressed for long periods
of time because the environment remains either
munificent or benign. In other words growth can
hide 'a multitude of sins,' and a favorable
environment might permit firms to enjoy profit-
ability in spite of managers" outdated mental
models (Whetten, 1988). Continued growth and
profitability might even further confirm and
strengthen outdated models, delaying change
until growth slows or stops and the effects of
inadequate mental models are felt (Hall, 1976,
1984). Hedberg and Jonsson (1977) suggest that
munificence not only delays recognition of the
need for change, but also slows or prevents the
development of alternative models. These ideas
suggest the following hypothesis:
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H2: Delays in the succession of mental models
will occur in munificent environments.
Changes in the environment may not be noticed
because they are not central to existing models.
As already noted, mental models specify the most
important or central elements of organizational
environments. More peripheral elements (as
defined by the mental model) may become
increasingly important as environments change, but
go unnoticed by managers. This problem is
compounded because '[m]ost strategic decisions do
not present themselves to the decision maker in
convenient ways; problems and opportunities in
particular must be identified in the streams of
ambiguous, largely verbal data' (Mintzberg et al.,
1976: 253).
Starbuck and Milliken (1988) suggest three
ways in which managers' perceptual filters might
affect noticing. First, individual habits and beliefs
will infiuence what they notice. Second, because
some stimuli are not actively noticed, they must
change dramatically in order to attract attention.
Finally, problems of noticing are institutionalized
at the organizational level because resources are
assigned to track those stimuli that top executives
have identified as important, while other stimuli
may go unnoticed simply because no effort is made
to track them. This suggests a third hypothesis;
H3: Delays in the succession of mental models
will occur if managers fail to detect a substantial
change in their organizations' environments.
Delays in the succession of mental models may
be due to the time required for learning. Many
theories of strategic change suggest that changes
in action do not occur until some level of stress
or pressure to change exceeds the level of inertia
or pressure for maintaining the status quo
(Ginsberg, 1988). Similar pressures may be
required to move managers through the learning
process. Work that emphasizes experimentation
(Van de Ven and Polley, 1992) and action
(Weick, 1979, 1983) as the sources of insight,
also suggest that time will be required before
new mental models can be constructed. In short,
the process of disposing of old beliefs and
discovering new beliefs takes time. These time
requirements suggest a final hypothesis:
H4: Delays in the succession of mental models
result from inherent delays in the learning
process.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Sample selection and time frame
The U.S. railroad industry was selected as a
context for the study. This industry environment
experienced a significant decline following the
end of World War II. During the 25 year time
period of the study, from 1949 through 1973, the
number of major railroads fell from 135 to
69. The railroads" market share among major
transporters fell from 58.4 to 38.4 percent, while
the motor carriers" market share increased from
13.8 to 22.6 percent {Moody's Transportation
Manual, 1989).
Our investigation focuses on the mental models
of the top managers of a matched pair of firms.
The need for careful matching led to the selection
of two Midwestern railroads, the C&NW and the
Rock Island.' Both firms shared a common
geography and were roughly the same size. In
addition, they had a remarkably similar traffic
base. The Rock Island derived a slightly higher
percentage of its revenue from agricultural
products; the C&NW. which served the iron ore
producing regions of Minnesota, received a
slightly higher percentage of its revenue from
mining products. Other traffic differences, how-
ever, are not significant (X- = 5.07, n.s.).
Since neither firm was a transcontinental
railroad, both derived a large proportion of their
freight revenue from 'bridge traffic"—freight
received from and delivered to other carriers
that neither originated nor terminated 'on-line*.
Furthermore, both railroads had a single focus
on railroad transportation at the beginning of
this study's time frame so other domain activities
should not mask the responses of each firm
to environmental decline. Finally, these two
railroads were selected because they experienced
different fates, suggesting that in spite of geo-
graphic traffic, and size similarities, their
responses to the changing environment may have
differed. The C&NW remains viable today; the
Rock Island sought bankruptcy protection in the
mid-1970s and ceased to exist. Table 1 describes
' Two compiinics thai were also matched in an earlier study
by Hambrick and D'Aveni (1988).
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performance characteristics of the two firms that
illustrate their growing disparity.
Methodology
The strategy literature assumes that organi-
zational actions are based on top managers'
attention to and subsequent understanding of the
environment (Andrews, 1987). Our interest is in
the interpretations of our sample firms' top
managers, how these interpretations change, and
the subsequent impact of these interpretations
on organizational responses. The methodology
employed to track these questions, cause map-
ping, avoids the recall biases of interviews
(Axctrod, 1976)—which would be especially
problematic given the time frame of the study—
and provides detailed, rigorously collected infor-
mation about managerial thinking that is not
typically found in case studies.
Cause mapping is a form of content analysis
that isolates the key assertions within a document
that deal with causality, existence, or categori-
zation, all basic issues for strategic decision
making. Assertions can be 'mapped' to gain a
larger picture of changing managerial beliefs, and
both map structure and individual statements can
be examined for changes over time. A detailed
list of protocols, further described below, were
used to identify and analyze these assertions.
The source of data for constructing cause maps
in the study is the 50 letters to shareholders
published by the two companies over the 25-year
period of the study. Researchers have used material
Table I. Characteristics of the sample firms
Average
Year
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
miles operated
C&NW
8,076
8,001
7,911
7,905
7,875
7.876
7,857
9.362
9,297
9,309
9,284
9,521
10,702
10,547
10,462
10,432
10,362
10,220
10,179
11,523
11,512
11,265
10,929
10.556
10,249
Rock
Island
7,621
7,610
7,921
7,916
7,903
7,895
7,921
7,597
7,606
7,584
7,535
7,533
7,850
7.843
7.838
7.792
7.793
7.467
7.360
7,277
7,277
7,177
7,507
7,495
7,385
Total Tons (000s)
C&NW
48,339
54,818
57,938
55.633
54,128
50,085
56.230
57,999
55.299
51,022
50,889
52,926
56,104
51,774
56,307
58,600
59,913
64,033
63,801
68,133
66.958
70,187
67,324
70.711
80,2(K)
Rock
Island
38,508
37,140
42,593
42,803
40,434
38,858
40,191
40,782
40,649
39,950
42,747
40,603
38,978
39,525
39,978
40,655
41.879
45.304
42,968
47,222
50.242
44,447
47,592
47,597
49.125
Freight traffic as
a percentage of
total freight and
passenger traffic
C&NW
77%
77
78
78
78
77
78
81
82
83
83
85
88
88
87
89
89
88
96
96
98
98
98
98
97
Rock
Island
81%
80
81
82
82
81
82
82
83
83
83
82
81
81
82
84
85
87
89
93
94
94
94
94
94
Operating ratio*
C&NW
90.6%
83.9
88.0
86.2
86.1
88.1
84.7
87.8
85.4
82.9
85.7
86.2
81.1
85.9
81.8
85.5
79.6
79.4
84,1
85,4
86.7
81.3
80,8
78.5
77,3
Rock
Island
73.3%
72.8
76.0
72.1
70.9
75.7
75.6
76.7
78.4
78.0
78.7
80.2
78.3
81.5
81.3
81.6
82.9
82.5
86.0
82.2
81.4
81.2
79.6
80.7
81.8
Operating income
as a percent of
gross revenues
C&NW
2.3%
7.6
4.0
4.9
4.3
1.2
4.0
1.3
3.7
5.0
1.0
0.0
4.9
0.0
5.2
4.9
5.6
6.7
0.5
0.0
-6 .5
2.7
4.0
5.2
5.3
Rock
Island
16.0%
16.6
13.1
18.5
19.3
12.8
13.5
12.0
8.1
8.2
6.6
4.0
5.2
3.1
3.8
3.5
1.2
0,1
-6 ,3
-3 .0
-3 .0
-5 .2
-1 .5
-1 .8
-5 .5
Source: Moody's Investor Services. Transportation Manual. 1989.
•The operating ratio represents the proportion of operating expenses to operating revenues and is therefore a measure of
operating efficiency. Obviously, a lower operating ratio is desirable.
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from annual reports to identify corporate strategies
(Bowman, 1978), to assess causal reasoning within
firms (Bettman and Weitz, 1983), and to explain
differences in joint venture activity (Fiol, 1989).
Nevertheless, these data are not ideal material for
revealing the mental models held by firm leaders.
Annual reports, especially in more recent years, are
typically prepared by public relations departments.
Even before the widespread use of such offices no
guarantee exists that letters to shareholders were
drafted by the executives who signed them—and
certainly the specific words used may well have
been edited by others in the organization. Some
systematic biases are also likely; unflattering
information about the top management team, for
example, will almost certainly be suppressed. Also
important is the possibility that expression in an
annual report may lag considerably behind an
actual change in managerial understanding.
Our response to these legitimate concerns is that
while annual reports may not be ideal, few rival
data sources exist that can provide insight into the
changing mental methods of top managers over
time. This data source also has the critical virtue
of being written in the time period of interest.
Letters to shareholders are prepared over short,
consistent intervals and are easily accessed. Further,
informal conversation with executives indicates that
they do have considerable involvement in preparing
communications with investors, particularly in times
of poor performance.
In the end, we used annual report data because
we believe this document is too important not to
be given close attention by top management, both
in terms of early subject framing and later word
level editing. Further, our focus in this paper is
on organizational level understanding, changes in
understanding, and the link between understanding
and an organization's actions. Rank of authorship
or change in specific authors is thus less important
than it might be if we were trying to attribute
responsiveness to a specific individual. Similarly,
while statements in the annual report may not
precisely mirror the time period of a change in
understanding, over long periods the exact timing
of changes in understanding is less important than
overall patterns of change.
Coding procedures
The coding scheme used in this study was
initially developed by Robert Axelrod (1976).
The analysis followed modifications by Huff,
Narapareddy, and Fletcher (1990) of the coding
manual developed by Wrightson for Axelrod
(Wrightson, 1976: 291-332). Concepts in the
text to be analyzed are connected by symbols
indicating causal and definitional relationships.
Instructions to coders indicate that concepts can
be thought of as variables capable of being
altered by the presence or absence of other
variables. Statements containing these concepts
are identified in source documents by the coder
and influence relationships are placed into one
of the nine categories identified in Table 2,
maintaining to the extent possible the wording
of the original document.
At the end of this procedure the phrases or
concepts connected by codes are assigned an
identifying letter. Individual concepts are exam-
ined for equivalency, following rules specified in
the code book, in an effort to capture the
essential parsimony of mental models. Variables
judged to be essentially equivalent are recoded
with the same letter. A 'map' or series of maps
is then constructed by connecting concepts with
arrows labeled with a symbol for the type of
relationship involved. For example, the two
sentences 'A further freak of weather delayed
the opening of navigation on Lake Superior and
on Lake Michigan. This inaccessibility retarded
very materially the season's program for move-
ment of iron ore." would be coded as follows:
A further freak of + delay in the open-
weather (A) ing of navigation
on Lake Superior
& on Lake Michi-
gan (B)
inaccessibility [of
navigation on Lake
Superior & on Lake
Michigan] (C)
season s program
for movement of
iron ore (D)
The coding procedure would equate concepts B
and C and yield the following map:
A further delay in the open- season's
freak of + ing of navigation - program
weather —> on Lake Superior-^ for move-
(A) & on Lake ment of
Michigan (B) iron ore (D)
22 P. S. Barr, J. L. Stimpert and A. S. Huff
Table 2. Coding categories
Symbol
1+/
t-l
IQl
l@l
Izi
Iml
lo/
/=/
lei
Definition
positively affects
negatively effects
will not hurt, does not prevent, is not
harmful
will not help, does not promote, is of no
benefit to
may or may not be related to, affects
indeterminably
affects in some nonzero way
does not matter for, has no affect on. has
no relation to
'is equivalent to, is defined as
'is an example of, is one member of
•Categories not used by Axelrod.
Two coders were used to analyze the data and
training of coders was based on documents similar
to those used in this study. A random document
was then chosen from the study material to
ascertain intercoder reliability, which yielded a
very satisfactory 93.4 percent agreement on the
codes assigned. Agreement on whether or not a
causal statement has been made is more difficult
to obtain, since some of these statements must
be inferred. In spite of this difficulty, we obtained
an intercoder reliability of 93.0 percent on this
part of the coding procedure. Applications of
this method in three studies conducted by
Axelrod, his associates (Axelrod, 1976: 227), and
others (Huff and Schwenk, 1990; Narayanan and
Fahey, 1990) have also enjoyed favorable results.
Once intercoder reliability was established, the
documents used in the study were randomly
assigned to the two coders. All passages for
which one coder had some doubt were discussed
with the other coder until a mutually satisfactory
code could be assigned. The principles involved
in resolving these issues were formalized into
written coding protocols. The maps were con-
structed jointly. One author then identified
instances of map change, discussing questionable
decisions with the other two authors.
Protocols for identifying map changes
The key construct for our analysis is a change in
mental model or map, which we believe is basic
evidence of managerial learning. To identify map
change systematically, we set up seven protocols
for identifying significant change across maps.
This is important because random noise due to
alternative word use must be expected in any
written document, and is exacerbated in longitudi-
nal analysis of many documents. The protocols
we devised focus on changes in concepts,
relationships, and map structures.
Categorical distinctiveness
The basic sign of new understanding is the use
of a new concept or the deletion of an old
concept. For example, the concept 'shorter
average haul' appeared as a new variable in
the map from C&NW's 1954 annual report in
causal association with 'poor firm performance';
weather related explanations, which appear in
early maps, disappear over time. Both examples
were coded as significant changes in the maps
involved.
Generalization
Another sign of learning is the recognition that
specific concepts have a family resemblance to
other concepts. Replacement of a specific concept
with a more general term is evidence of this kind
of change. Individual snowstorms are mentioned
in the 1949 map from the C&NW, for example,
but in subsequent years the reports contain
much more general discussions of 'unfavorable
weather.' -• . .
Pattern of inclusion
The introduction of a new category is an
indication that learning has taken place; the
sustained use of new variables is an even more
important indicator of learning. For example, in
1950 traffic flows due to the Korean conflict were
mentioned as an important concept linked to
increased freight and passenger traffic in the
C»&NW"s annual report. Because this concept
was not included in subsequent maps, however,
the temporary appearance of the Korean conflict
was not considered an important change in
managerial understanding. On the other hand,
the concept of 'becoming more competitive'
appeared and then consistently reappeared in
successive C&NW maps; this was taken as a
strong indication of macro level change in
understanding.
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Linkage to other concepts
The degree of learning is assumed to be
incremental or low level when a variable change
does not involve many linkages or does not
disrupt the continuity of an existing causal chain.
On the other hand, if a new concept results in
new clusters, its addition represents a more
significant change in understanding. The concept
of 'efficiency' appearing in the C&NW letters
can serve as an illustration of this more significant
change. Efficiency appears in the 1953 C&NW
letter as the result of increases In diesel locomotive
power and as a causal input leading to improved
firm welfare. It accounts for two causal linkages
in the map. By 1958, however, efficiency is
central to the mental map, with four preceding
causal linkages and three proceeding linkages.
The addition of the efficiency concept to the
1953 map was judged to be an incremental
change since the accompanying linkages are few.
In aggregate, however, the change from 1953 to
1958 as efficiency becomes a central concept in
the map with seven total linkages represents a
macro level change in understanding.
Change in causal signs '
* _
Magnitude of mental map change may also be
determined by the change in signs between
established relationships. When a change from a
positive causal association ( + ) to the more
neutral 'does not have a negative effect on'
association (0) is an example of a relatively
incremental change, some change in understand-
ing has taken place, since the causal variable
does not have as great an impact on the effect
concept as claimed in the past. Sign reversals
suggest a much greater change. One example of
this kind of shift involves freight rates. Initially,
higher rates are associated with higher revenues;
7 years later, however, lower rates are seen as
necessary if revenues are to be increased.
Changes in examples or subsets
The degree of difference between examples or
subsets can also be an indicator of magnitude.
Simple additions or subtractions from lists of
examples or equalities are coded as incremental
changes in the map. A change of greater
magnitude is represented by lists that are replaced
with new, unrelated variables. In the second
case, the definition of the concept has changed—
it no longer means what it did in previous texts—
and this change is taken as an indicator of higher
level learning.
Replacement
The final indicator of magnitude is the amount
of continuity. If, from one map to the next, only
a small proportion of the total concepts are
altered, this suggests that the change in under-
standing is incremental. If, on the other hand, a
major proportion of the map is altered, the
change in understanding is considered more
significant.
RESULTS
A comparison of the 25 Rock Island mental maps
with the 25 C&NW maps show many early
similarities that diminish over time, suggesting
that the effort to find two initially similar firms
that suffer different fates was successful. Tables
3 and 4 summarize the results of the analysis for
the major concept groups contained in the
C&NW and Rock Island, respectively. For each
railroad, these tables show the number of
concepts; the number of linkages; the occurrences
of generalizations; and the changes in signs,
examples or subsets, and linkage to other concept
groups in each year. The complexity of the maps
and of the changes that occurred over time,
however, cannot be fully reflected in a table
format. Important changes are therefore
described throughout the discussion of results
and illustrated with the relevant maps.
The early maps for both firms attributed
declines in performance to weather, government
programs, and regulation. A representative map
for both firms is the 1951 map of the Rock Island
found in Figure 2. Of the 30 concepts appearing
in this map, 18 (or 60 percent) deal with issues
of weather, government, and the economy. The
C&NW map for the same year showed 15
concepts (or 50 percent) devoted to weather,
government, and the economy.
The two railroads' views began to diverge in
the late 1950s. As shown in Figure 3, the C&NW
map shifts in 1956 as more concepts dealing with
firm productivity, management, and firm-level
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Table 3. CNW map summary
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"S - change in sign, E = change in example/subset, G - generalization. L = change in linkage
cost issues begin to appear. These concepts are
directly linked to firm performance and account
for 21 of 30 (or 73 percent) of the total concepts.
In contrast, the Rock Island's cause maps
continue to emphasize the industry throughout
the 1950s and early 1960s. Letters to shareholders
still associate a large share of the railroad's
problems with those of the industry. The firm's
problems are seen as temporary and beyond its
control. Evidence of a succession in mental
models for the Rock Island does not appear until
1964, when for the first time its map attributes
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Table 4. Rock Island map summary
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poor performance to firm actions that result in
increased costs. Twenty-six of the 42 concepts
(62 percent) deal with firm-level concerns or
actions linked to performance in the 1964 Rock
Island map. This map is illustrated in Figure 4.
For both firms, major changes in mental
models were reflected in more proactive strategies
reported elsewhere in the annual reports and in
the business press. Following a major change in
mental models in 1956, the C&NW made plans
for reducing costs, raising productivity, and
increasing maintenance-of-way to improve its
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Figure 2. Cause map of the Rock Island. 1951
cotnpetitive position in the industry. The Rock
Island, on the other hand, delays maintenance-
of-way and does little to control costs. The Rock
Island's managers see an 'upward spiral" of costs
as the result of an inflationary economy that is
beyond their control. The firm does attempt to
increase sales to be in a better position when
'temporary economic adjustment" ends; but this
action is in accord with past behavior. A major
focus in the Rock Island maps is on what its
managers would like others to do; they specifically
emphasize the need for legislation to change
regulatory policies. Not until 1964, when the
Rock Island's financial resources are nearly
depleted and its property badly deteriorated by
deferred maintenance, do its leaders shift their
mental models and adopt a plan of action—
merger with the Union Pacific railroad.
In general, data from the 50 maps support
three of our four hypotheses:
Hypothesis I. All indicators of mental model
change provide support for Hypothesis 1. The
leadership of the C&NW—the firm that renewed
its strategy and still survives—exhibits a definite
succession in mental models in 1956. Further-
more, the mental models of the C&NW"s leaders
continued to change in both incremental and
more significant ways throughout the study
period. In contrast, the Rock Island's leadership
does not experience a succession in its mental
model until 1964, a full 8 years after the C&NW
shift, a delay that may have been critical to the
Rock Island"s demise.
Hypothesis 2. We found some support for
Hypothesis 2, that delays in the succession of
mental models are associated with environmental
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munificence. As Table 1 indicates, the Rock
Island did enjoy relatively high performance in
the early 1950s due to post-war economic
prosperity and a surge in business activity
associated with the Korean War. The C&NW,
on the other hand, did not experience the same
degree of prosperity. Relative prosperity may
have accounted for the Rock Island"s tendency
to view traffic declines as part of a 'temporary
economic adjustment which will be of compara-
tively short duration." In other words, the firm"s
relative prosperity may have masked symptoms
of decline In the railroad industry that were
apparent to other observers, including the leaders
of the Ct&NW. Huff and Schwenk"s (1990) study
of the oil industry indicates a similar inattention
to environmental issues when firm performance
deviates from industry averages.
Hypothesis 3. We did not find support for
Hypothesis 3, that delays in the succession of
mental models result from a failure to detect
substantial changes in the environment. The maps
for both firms indicate that changes in the
environment were quickly noticed. The Rock
Island"s managers see disturbing trends as early
as 1950 (eight concepts in the 1950 letter to
shareholders are concerned with competition
from trucks, airlines, barges, and pipelines), but
fail to associate these trends with a larger shift
in the environment. Its managers easily reconcile
this new competition with their existing mental
model that blames declines in freight traffic
primarily on external forces over which the
managers have little control. In fact, seven of
the eight concepts relating to competition are seen
as resulting from disadvantageous government
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Figure 4. Cause map of the Rock Island. 1964
regulatory activity and not from any internal
company weakness. Threats from increased com-
petition begin to disappear from the Rock Island's
map in 1954, when leaders of the firm indicate
that any traffic declines are part of a 'temporary'
phenomenon, and are not seen in the maps
during the years 1957 through 1961.
The C&NW's managers, on the other hand,
saw declines in traffic as important concepts
signaling permanent changes in the environment
that would require internal changes. The 1956
letter to shareholders is indicative of this new
thinking, noting that 'the C&NW has ...
the highest wage-revenue ratio of any major
railroad in the United States,' which requires
the railroad 'to increase the productivity of all
personnel." Greater efficiency and lower costs,
in turn, are expected to lead to a strengthened
competitive position for the C&NW. Nearly all
of the coded concepts from the 1957 and 1958
letters to shareholders are related to improving
productivity or increasing the railroad"s
competitiveness.
These results suggest that organizational
renewal requires that managers not only notice
changes, but that noticing must lead to new
understandings and the adoption of appropriate
responses. This is a theme to which we will
return later.
Hypothesis 4. Although many signs of learn-
ing can be found in the maps, they are not
completely consistent with the literature used to
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generate Hypothesis 4. The maps of the C&NW
do exhibit definite signs of unlearning and
learning. Prior to the major succession of
mental models that occurs in 1956, concepts are
continually added and deleted from the maps—
a sign of the experimentation that is usually
associated with the learning process. When the
succession of mental models occurs, new plans
based on these new causal attributions are
instituted. This signals an end to the unlearning
and change phases.
The new map, however, does not 'refreeze."
New concepts and connections continue to
appear. For example, the C&NW's acquisition
of other railroads and a proposal to merge with
another railroad are all pursued in an effort to
improve the C&NW's average length of haul and
other traffic characteristics (changes that are
reflected in the size of the C&NW's system and
increases in its tonnage as shown in Table 1).
In 1961, 5 years after the succession in mental
maps began, the company begins to focus on
the fact that its business is not only 'highly
competitive,' but also 'cyclically sensitive' (6 of
26 concepts).
By contrast, the Rock Island never appears to
engage in a process of unlearning, and when
change does occur, subsequent maps are immedi-
ately refrozen. Little significant change in the
map occurs from 1949 to 1964; when the change
does occur, it is sudden and complete. In 1964,
the focus of the mental model shifts from general
economic and industry factors to firm-level
factors, with only 10 of 42 concepts concerned
with the industry and general economy. A merger
with the Union Pacific appears in the model for
the first time and is proposed as the only way
for the Rock Island to 'remain a viable and
independent operation.' From 1964 until the end
of the study period the maps continue to focus
on the merger. In 1964. 10 of 42 concepts deal
directly with the merger. By 1970. the merger is
the central focus of the mental model and al!
concepts deal with either the merger itself or
with actions taken to remain solvent until the
merger is approved. Interestingly, government
action continues as an important concept through-
out this period. Government action (and inaction)
is described as hindering completion of the
merger and thwarting company efforts to remain
in business long enough for the merger to be
consummated. Overall, the Rock Island's maps
show little or no evidence of experimentation.
Managerial thinking appears to move from one
'frozen" state to the next.
RENEWAL AS A LEARNING PROCESS
To summarize, a change in a mental model is
definitely associated with strategic renewal for
the C&NW, but inattention to changing environ-
mental conditions is not the key distinction
between the C&NW's renewal and the Rock
Island"s decline. Nor does the issue seem to be
the time required for a new understanding to
take hold as suggested in Hypothesis 4. Instead,
the evidence suggests that what distinguishes the
C&NW from the Rock Island is whether the
learning process occurs at all. The C&NW"s
unlearning took at least 6 years, and the process
of learning does not appear to end during the
remaining 19 years of the study period. The Rock
Island's managers, in contrast, exhibit no sign of
a learning process. Instead, their shift from one
mental model to another was immediate.
To further explore the question of how the
C&NW managed to renew its strategy, we
examined the maps in more detail, focusing
exclusively on explanations of performance.
Furthermore, to capture the impact of incremen-
tal as well as larger shifts in understanding, we
explicity compared changes in each map with
maps from 5 years previous.
The results of this analysis show that even in
the first 6 years of the study period the maps
of the C&NW include many small signs of
incremental, low level changes in understanding
about firm performance. In 1949, for example,
the company offers a quite detailed explanation
for their 'great loss in revenue' as shown in
Figure 5. By 1954, another year of 'disappointing'
results, more general references to a downward
trend in the economy occur. Yet poor perform-
ance is also more extensively linked to internal
factors. Many of these unfavorably compare the
company to its competitors. The company also
begins to describe ways it could more actively
address its poor performance, including appli-
cation to the government to eliminate unprofit-
able routes and the wider use of diesel power.
All of these factors are causally linked to the
C&NW's narrower margins.
As already noted, weather related explanations
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Figure 5. Cause map of the C&NW. 1949
for poor performance which appear in the early
years become more generally expressed and are
then dropped in later reports as an explanation for
performance results. Government programs also
begin to decrease in frequency and are no longer
linked to overall firm performance. This appears
to be an example of the 'unlearning' that is
necessary before high level or second order learning
can occur.
High level learning occurs as the culmination of
this series of incremental changes. In 1956, the
C&NW map shifts to refiect even heavier emphasis
on firm productivity and firm level cost issues than
in previous years and productivity and cost control
now are seen as directly affecting firm performance.
The 1956 map, which we categorized as showing
a major difference from preceding documents, was
shown in Figure 3.
The new concepts in this map (which include
"new operating techniques," 'new maintenance
techniques." 'new conservative accounting poli-
cies," 'new supervisory personnel." and 'the
passage of time") are well linked to other
concepts. The report now ties the fact that 'the
C&NW has ... the highest wage-revenue ratio
of any major railroad in the United States," to
a new consequence—the necessity that the
railroad 'increase the productivity of all person-
nel." This, in turn, is expected to lead to a
strengthened competitive position for the
C&NW (another new concept) which suffers
along with the rest of the railroad industry from
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receiving a declining share of the total intercity
freight revenue due to competition from other
modes of transportation (a long established
concept).
Another significant change that appears in this
document is the recognition that the railroad
industry is highly competitive. As a result,
managers now believe that rate reductions are
needed in order to challenge trucks and barges,
which are becoming increasingly competitive.
This is a particularly interesting example of
change in a mental model. In the C&NW's early
maps, increasing freight rates is a concept with
a positive causal link to firm performance. In
the 1958 map. which follows the 1956 shift in
understanding about the competitive nature of
the industry, the relationship between rates and
firm performance reverses. At this time a decrease
in rates is positively linked to performance. The
increasingly competitive nature of the 'transpor-
tation industry' (yet another example of an
increasingly general concept) is cited as the
reason why railroads must be allowed to lower
rates. The need to reduce rates, in turn., further
increases the need to reduce costs.
Another interesting aspect of the C&NW's
strategic renewal is how the definitions of
concepts change over time. In 1951, for example,
efficiency was defined as increases in load per
train. In 1958, following changes in strategic
action, efficiency refers to higher productivity
and streamlined operations.
A comparison of the 1956 and 1951 maps
shows that a major proportion of the 1956 map
contains new concepts. In 1951, 50 percent of
the concepts concerned weather, government,
and the economy. In the 1956 map 73 percent of
the concepts deal wth productivity, management,
firm-level cost issues, and overall firm perform-
ance. This change, combined with changes in the
definitions of long established concepts, illustrates
a shift in thinking that we believe exemplifies
strategic renewal. While annual reports may lag
actual strategic learning, as discussed previously,
it seems highly unlikely that such a major change
in the way in which performance is discussed in
this public document does not also reflect a
major shift in understanding inside the company.
As noted above, revitalization of the mental
map can also be linked directly to strategic
action. When the mental model of the C&NW's
leaders shifts focus in 1956, plans for cost
reduction, increased productivity, and mainte-
nance of way are undertaken to assure a
competitive position in the industry. After taking
into account the railroad's higher proportion of
passenger train miles, management also begins
to reduce its activity in this low profit, high cost
operation (see Table 1). Overall, the railroad
undertakes changes in action designed to make
it more efficient and productive.
These changes in strategic action appear to be
part of a larger process of experimentation that
furthers the learning process. The emphasis on
productivity, introduced as a well connected
concept in 1956. becomes even more central in
subsequent years. Nearly all of the coded concepts
from the 1957 and 1958 annual reports aim at
improving productivity or increasing competi-
tiveness.
In spite of this emphasis on efficiency, the
C&NW's operating ratio remained stubbornly
high throughout the 1950s, as shown in Table 1.
The failure of the company's programs to reduce
the operating ratio may be the reason why new
concepts and connections continue to appear in
the C&NW maps as actions confirm or discredit
beliefs and lead to new strategic action.
The need to cut costs, reduce rates, improve
traffic characteristics, and offset the cyclical
nature of the business are all concepts that
develop over time, prompting new programs to
increase productivity. By 1965, these concepts
are linked to the company's 'intention to diversify
into contracyclical businesses when appropriate
opportunities become available,' an intention that
led to the acquisition of two chemical companies.
Diversification is predicted to have a positive
effect on net income in 1966 and the years ahead.
The next year 'the objective of the chemical
diversification program' (again, a more gen-
eralized concept) is described as 'cushioning your
company against ... adverse aspects of rail
operations.' This focus on 'cushioning' and
revenue gains continues until 1968 when 'growth'
is identified as a company performance objective.
By 1973, however, after a year of poor perform-
ance, 'management's objective' is again equated
with the more conservative aim of 'making
North Western an ever stronger company.' An
interesting foray into a more aggressive definition
of performance was apparently reviewed by
managers who chose to retreat to previously
established concepts.
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COGNITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO
THEORIES OF LEARNING, EXECUTIVE
SUCCESSION, ATTRIBUTION, AND THE
DEPLOYMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL
RESOURCES
We began this paper with a puzzle: Why is
one firm able to recuperate from declining
performance, while their very similar compatriot
facing very similar circumstances is not? Given
a careful match of internal resources and external
conditions, we turned to theories of managerial
cognition for a resolution to this puzzle.
Initially, our idea was that firms accomplishing
strategic renewal observe changes in their
environments more quickly than less responsive
firms. Data from our study did not support this
idea. Both of the firms we studied were quick
to recognize decline in the rail industry. However,
the leaders of the C&NW not only recognize
changes in their environment, they also gradually
change their mental models of how organizational
performance is affected by the changed environ-
ment. This characterisic of the surviving firm is
in line with the theories of Nystrom and Starbuck
(1984) that stress the importance of learning.
Learning at the C&NW
The process of strategic renewal at C&NW was
more complex than the two-tiered models of
learning usually found in the management litera-
ture. The evidence from 25 years shows that
neither the level nor the stages of learning were
necessarily discrete for this company. Low level
learning appears to lead directly to high level
learning, as the C&NW makes minor changes in
its understanding that is followed by related, but
much more dramatic, changes in mental models.
This pattern supports the idea that the relationship
between mental models and action is mutually
reinforcing. Unexpected results lead to a ques-
tioning of current causal beliefs. Adjustments to
these beliefs are made and new actions are
undertaken that test newly asserted relationships.
It appears likely that as supporting evidence
mounts, more significant changes in both beliefs
and actions are undertaken, though the data from
this study do not allow us to be sure of the extent
to which incremental changes in belief are tested
with changes in action, and the extent to which
changes in action result in changes in belief.
At the Rock Island, in contrast, changes in
beliefs and action are not undertaken until the
railroad is near bankruptcy. The mental model
then changes abruptly to focus on the proposed
merger and measures required to stay in business
long enough to consummate the merger.
This juxtaposition suggests that an incremental
approach to strategic renewal, one that incorpo-
rates a good deal of trial and error, is preferable
to an approach that delays any changes in action
until a preponderance of evidence suggests that
a major renewal effort is warranted. Not only
does the latter approach hinder experimentation,
but action may well be delayed until time is
limited and resources are constrained.
Finally, though environmental change in the
railway industry in the time period of this study
appears to warrant major, second level change,
it will not always be the case that major change
is desirable. It is possible that change in mental
models of firm leaders could lead to a Type 1
error, as Walsh and Ungson propose:
Perhaps for fear of committing ... [a] Type II
decision error ... leads decision makers to
commit a Type I error. Analogously. Kerr (1975)
reasoned that physicians would much prefer to
diagnose a well person sick, rather than a sick
person as well. In the management arena,
decision makers may employ a controlled
retrieval process to formulate a nonroutine
decision response when a routine response based
on an automatic retrieval process would suffice.
In this instance, the costs to be borne are largely
opportunity costs. The decision makers could
have engaged other problems with their time
and talents (1991: 76).
Further studies, some of which might employ a
matched sample design of the type we used in
other environmental settings, will be necessary
to further flesh out the difficult problems of
appropriate level of response to external stimuli.
Mental models, strategic change, and executive
succession
The strategy field is witnessing a growing interest
in the relationship between the characteristics of
top management team members and firm strategies
and in the relationship between executive succession
and strategy (Hambrick and Mason. 1984). Recent
studies suggest that younger managers, those with
less company and industry experience, and those
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with higher levels of education are likely to be
associated with greater levels of strategic change
(Grimm and Smith. 1991; Thomas. Litschert. and
Ramaswamy. 1991).
Our study suggests that mental models of
managers are a better predictor than managerial
characteristics of whether changes in top manage-
ment team membership will be associated with
changes in strategy. During the 25-year study
period, the C&NW had one change and the Rock
Island had three changes in leadership. While
management change at the C&NW was associated
with a major change in strategy, only one of the
management changes at the Rock Island was
associated with a major change in strategy.
An examination of these four executive suc-
cessions raises questions about hypothesized
relationships between managerial characteristics
and changes in strategy. Ben Heineman became
the C&NWs new chairman in 1956. He was
young (though not the youngest of the individuals
involved in the four executive successions). He
also had very limited experience with either the
C&NW or the railroad industry.
By contrast. Jervis Langdon. who became
the Rock Island's chairman in 1964 and whose
succession was also associated with a major change
in strategy, was the oldest individual to be involved
in an executive succession at our two sample firms
during the study period. Though Langdon had no
previous experience at the Rock Island, he did
have 34 years of railroad experience.
It appears that the attitudes and beliefs that
these individuals brought to their new posts were
a far greater influence on their strategic decision
making than their demographic characteristics.
Having never held a staff position at a railroad
company, Heineman's previous experience as a
corporate lawyer may have prevented him from
rationalizing the poor performance of the C&NW
and probably led to his insistence on promoting
efficiency and 'business-like practices."
Langdon had been a railroad lawyer since
1930; he came to the Rock Island from the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (B&O) where he
had served as general counsel. Like the Rock
Island, the B&O had experienced a long decline.
In advocating a Rock Island-Union Pacific
merger. Langdon may have drawn from his own
experience helping to plan the B&O's merger
with the Chesapeake and Ohio which, like the
Union Pacific, was a much stronger railroad.
Langdon may have come to the Rock Island with
the belief that weak railroads should merge or
be acquired by stronger railroads.
Attribution theory
Previous studies in attribution theory have
found that firm leaders tend to attribute poor
performance to external forces while attributing
good performance to internal activities (Bowman,
1976; Salancik and Meindl, 1984; Weiner, Freize,
Kukla. Reed, Rest, and Rosenbaum, 1972). This
pattern of attribution does not hold in our study.
Both railroads began (he study period attributing
poor performance to outside factors. In the case
of the C&NW. however, external attributions
involving the weather and strikes, are dropped
as concepts directly and adversely related to
performance prior to an improvement in perform-
ance.
On the other hand, the Rock Island attributes
performance to external factors throughout the
study period, even in the early years when
performance was still good. Good performance
is attributed to bumper harvests of crops and
upswings in the economy that enhanced demand
for ores, automobiles, and other cargos hauled
by the railroads. Poor performance, and even
difficulties in achieving a merger with the Union
Pacific, is blamed on external factors such as the
weather, the economy, and the government—
concepts present in Rock Island's maps through-
out the study period.
These results suggest that attributions are not
solely attempts at impression management or
rationalization as suggested by previous authors,
but result from managers' interpretations of
environmental changes (Huff and Schwenk, 1990)
that are based on differences in their mental
models. Further research in other settings might
uncover other variations in attributions that can
be linked to mental model differences.
Resource deployment
Our study suggests that the mental models of
firm leaders play a critical role in directing
resource accumulation. A number of researchers
are exploring how. over time, managers select
market domains and develop unique stocks of
strategic factors or assets that contribute to
competitive advantage (Barney, 1986; Werner-
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felt. 1984). Less explored by these resource-
based researchers is the infiuence top managers
have on the accumulation of assets and resources.
Our study suggests that the mental models of
firm leaders play a critical role in directing the
path of the resource accumulation process, and
the link between mental models and patterns of
resource acquisition may be a potential addition
to the resource-based theory of the firm.
CONCLUSIONS
Though we have examined organizational
responses to a declining environment, we
believe that our findings are also applicable to
firms operating in rapidly growing industries.
In both situations, top managers' mental models
must keep pace with a changing environment.
Just as declining industry conditions can trap
some firms in a downward spiral, a rapidly
growing environment can leave some firms
behind if their top managers' mental models
fail to consider important new areas of oppor-
tunity or technological developments. Even in
comparatively static environments, firms whose
top managers' mental models fail to acquire
important new concepts may be severely handi-
capped over time.
These possibilities for further generalization
make us especially enthusiastic about the cogni-
tive theories we have used in this study of
organization renewal. All firms need to assume
that their actions must fit a changing environment.
Classic works in the strategy literature assume
the importance of firm leaders in achieving this
renewal, but many writers are vague about
exactly how firm leaders have an impact on
performance. We have suggested that three key
managerial activities involve: (1) attention to
environmental changes. (2) the interpretation of
stimuli, and (3) the matching of perceived
problems with solutions. Each of these tasks
relies on managerial beliefs about causality.
Our data suggest that the process of developing
new beliefs about causality is not easy. Managers
who fail to consider changes in their beliefs
during periods of major environmental change
may set their firms on a course of a protracted.
downward spiral. Organizational leaders who can
manage these activities may win the battle of
organizational renewal.
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